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INSURANCE RACKETS

O

By F. L. GRANT of the Denver Bar

NE OF the great bugaboos of insurance companies is a
racket which has become nationwide by individuals
and groups who simulate accidents in order to collect
insurance. They travel from city to city, each group specializing in and becoming expert in its own particular type of
accident. Or, at other times, when a slight injury has been
sustained, it suddenly grows into one of serious magnitude by
the time a demand is made on the insurance carrier for compensation.
This situation is not, however, confined to groups or
gangs but individuals as well as husbands and wives have
taken it up. The pretended injuries usually claimed grow
out of slipping on a banana peel in some large department or
chain store, tripping or falling on alleged defective stairways,
slipping or. a wet floor, falling from a bus or street car alleged to have started before giving time to alight, claiming
to have eaten in a restaurant food containing ground glass
or other foreign substance, stumbling over some alleged
obstruction or object in a store aisle and numerous other
cleverly thought out ways.
Then again, there are groups of conspirators who take
out heavy insurance for personal injury, deliberately submit
to some form of injury by the insured automobile, the driver
of which then assumes all the blame so there can be no defense
and the driver then gets a "rake-off" out of the insurance
money which the injured receives.
These are phases of criminal activity that are generally
unknown and unappreciated by the general public. Impartial investigation recently by a metropolitan newspaper revealed that at least $14,000,000 had passed in one year from
legitimate channels into the hands of racketeers through these
fraudulent claims. The recent case in Los Angeles of five
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men and a woman as members of a nationwide ring of insurance racketeers again calls attention to the great extent to
which this racket is being carried on across the country. The
Los Angeles Examiner of June 15th said:
"As though a door had been flung open on a torture chamber of
the dark ages, District Attorney Buron Fitts' office yesterday announced
the arrest of six persons in shattering an alleged California link of. a
nationwide insurance racket ring which operated by almost unbelievable means. The members of the organization, including some of the
six held in custody, were said to have subjected themselves voluntarily to mutilation and torture to collect damages from insurance
companies. The conspirators, it is said, received at the hands of accomplices, broken bones, deep head injuries, bruises and dangerous lacerations. These were disclosed through an undercover man of the
District Attorney's office who worked himself into the local gang
and willingly submitted to tortures and a strange blood transfusion
to give the appearance of a fractured skull."
"Fitts named William Bone and Martin Biggs of Long Beach as
ringleaders. One suspect is Henry C. Groseclose of Long Beach who
is said to have settled for $8,000 with an insurance company for a
spine injury he claims he received when he was struck by Biggs' car
last February."

The New York Times of November 8th had the following article:
"A jury in the Queens Supreme Court found against the plaintiff
in a personal injury suit growing out of an automobile accident after
a motion picture exhibited in the court room, had shown the plaintiff,
who contended he could not get along without a cane, walking about
the street near his home walking freely, hands in his pockets and without a cane.
"Trial of the action was started Monday with Antonio Pasqua,
50 years old, a fruit peddler hobbling through the court room to the
witness stand with the aid of a cane. He told how he was shoveling
earth into a wheelbarrow on Penrod Street near his home, when a
truck of the McDonald Construction Company on contract in the
street, backed into him, fracturing his pelvis and causing internal injuries. After months in the hospital, he testified he 'has not been
able to walk without a cane.'
Medical testimony was introduced by
his attorney purporting to show Pasqua had suffered a fracture and
internal injuries. The case was adjourned over Election Day and
yesterday the defense was heard. After witnesses bad testified as
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to what they had described as safety measures by the Company, the
defense obtained permission to put up a movie screen in the Court room
in view of the judge and jury and show a motion picture. The operator of the machine had taken the picture in May and the principal
person shown in the picture was the plaintiff. The court and jury
thus saw the man claimed to be Pasqua walking freely, hands in his
pockets and with neither a cane nor a limp. At one place in the
picture, the operator had seen a man walking along with Pasqua who
was an investigator for the attorney who had brought the action."

A recent personal injury case in Chicago, which resulted
disastrously for the plaintiff, is told by an insurance carrier:
"Our investigation showed our assured was liable but we did not
think the injuries were really serious. The plaintiff's attorney contended that his client had a serious sacro-iliac injury. Shortly after
the accident, one of our regular investigators caught the claimant working at a forge but he quit work immediately when he discovered our
investigator was observing him. We thereupon put- a special and
The special investigator
very resourceful investigator on the case.
cultivated the acquaintance of the claimant and obtained his confidence
to such an extent that the claimant confided in him that there was a
law suit pending and was instructed by his attorney to do no work.
However, our special investigator represented himself as being a contractor and offered to put the claimant to work in a town a considerable distance from the large city in which the claimant resided. The
claimant took the job and worked for several days for the special
investigator, mixing concrete, laying sidewalks, lifting heavy bags of
sand, dirt, cement, tools, etc. While 'doing this work the injured
never complained of any disability resulting from the accident. While
he was working, a motion picture operator employed by the special
investigator was taking pictures of the plaintiff at work. Of course,
the operator was operating the machine from a concealed position.
"When the case was being tried, plaintiff swore that he had done
no work since the accident except a little on a forge but that he had
been obliged to quit-that work because of a pain in his back. His
doctor testified that the plaintiff had a severe sacro-iliac sprain, two
fractured ribs, strain of the lower back, that he had been totally disabled up to the date of the trial was not able to do any manual labor
and that the injured would require treatment for an additional six
months and probably would not be able to do any work until after the
expiration of that period of time. Our attorney then put on the
witness stand the special investigator who swore the plaintiff had
done cement work and other types of work and that he had had motion
pictures taken of the plaintiff doing this work. Our attorney then
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put on the screen two rolls of film and started with the third one when
the plaintiff's attorney jumped up and said he had seen enough and
moved for a dismissal of the case. It cost us heavily to prepare this
defense but it was worth while."

The official publication of the police department of Los
Angeles, The Daily Police Bulletin, recently contained this
information concerning Nathan Kazatsky and his wife Eva:
"The above subjects engage in defrauding insurance companies
by staging fake accidents and collecting, or attempting to collect, on
liability policies. They contact some young man who owns a car, take
out a policy on same and use him in assisting them to plan a fake automobile accident. The above subjects pay the premium on the policy
on the young man's automobile. The young man who operates the
automobile and the subject go to some isolated corner near a hospital
where there are no witnesses and fake an injury under an assumed name,
make a report to the local police department and subjects go into a
hospital and they use blood that is drawn from their arm (previous
to the accident) which they conceal, in a small vial and hide same in a
package of cigarettes, and when an opportunity presents itself they
place a few drops of this blood in the urine, which would indicate
serious kidney injury, which successfully fools the doctors."

The National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters has just released a Visomatic Talking Slide film
"Stop That Thief" which is now available to clubs and interested groups at a nominal rental at 222 Western Union
offices in the United States.
This film exposes the nationwide fake accident racket
portraying in a dramatic manner what it is, the cost to the
public and ho; the public can combat it. It forcefully
shows to what proportions the fake accident and fraudulent
claim racket has gone. It uncovers the method of jury fixers,
ambulance chasers, perjury and unethical members of the legal
and medical professions in their deliberately planned faking
of accident and bribes and perjury upon collection of damages
on fraudulent claims. The picture presents convincing
factual evidence in fast moving sequences, covering a total of
about 15 minutes, of the effect of this racket upon legitmiate
business.

FORECLOSURE BY SALE BY PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF
DEEDS OF TRUST IN COLORADO
By PERCY S. MORRIS of the Denver Bar
VER since the inception of the conveying of real estate
in Colorado deeds of trust have been in common use,
a deed of trust, as herein mentioned, being an instrument which by its terms conveys real estate to a grantee, as
trustee, as security for an indebtedness, with power given by
the instrument to the trustee to sell the property at public
sale upon certain notice in the event of default in the payment
of the debt and to convey the property to the purchaser at
such sale and apply the proceeds upon the indebtedness.
Until 1894 the deeds of trust executed in Colorado were
to individuals as trustees and under their provisions the trustee was given the power to and did sell the property at public
sale, after advertising the sale for a period specified in the
deed of trust, and execute a Trustee's Deed conveying the
property to the purchaser immediately upon the sale being
held and the highest bid being accepted, there being no right
of redemption from such sale.
In 1894 a statute was passed creating the office of Public
Trustee in each county in the state and containing provisions
regarding the method of the foreclosure by advertisement and
sale by the Public Trustee of deeds of trust executed to the
Public Trustee and providing the time and manner of redemption from such sale. Such statute further provided that
from and after its passage all deeds of trust given to secure
indebtedness of any kind shall name as trustee the Public
Trustee and that any deed of trust that shall name any other
person as trustee therein shall be deemed and taken to be a
mortgage and foreclosed only as mortgages were then foreclosed in and through the Courts (1921 Colorado Compiled
Laws secs. 5044 et seq.; 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated,
Chapter 40 Section 52, et seq,)
This act was approved
March 8, 1894, and became effective on that date.
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Therefore all deeds of trust executed to private trustees
prior to the passage of the 1894 act could be foreclosed by
advertisement and sale by such private trustee without any
right of redemption from the sale and this also is true even
though the time of payment of the indebtedness secured thereby was extended after the passage of the 1894 act (Brewer
vs. Harrison, 27 Colo. 349, 62 Pac. 224; Smissaert vs. The
Prudential Insurance Co., 15 Colo. App. 442, 62 Pac. 967).
And deeds of trust to private trustees executed after the passage of the 1894 Act could not be foreclosed by advertisement
and sale by the Trustee but could be foreclosed only as mortgages by suit in Court.
But deeds of trust executed to the Public Trustee may
be foreclosed as a mortgage by judicial proceedings (Neikirk
vs. Boulder National Bank, 53 Colo. 350, 353, 127 Pac.
137) or they may be foreclosed by advertisement and sale by
the Public Trustee without the necessity of any Court proceedings and without the expense, the delay and the necessity
of securing service of Summons which would be required if
the foreclosure had to be by a suit in Court.
The Colorado Statutes prescribe various successive acts
and steps in the proceedings for foreclosure of a deed of trust
to the Public Trustee by advertisement and sale by the Public
Trustee from the time such proceedings are commenced until,
by the execution and delivery of the Public Trustee's Deed,
the foreclosure is completed. And the purpose of this
article is to state and discuss the steps in such proceedings in
their order so as to provide a guide in the handling of such
proceedings and to be of assistance in guarding against the
omission of some necessary step or- the doing in an incorrect
manner of any of the acts necessary to constitute a valid foreclosure. Much of what is contained herein may be considered elementary, but, if all of the steps in the foreclosure
are to be outlined, it is necessary that much that is elementary
be mentioned.
The Courts hold that the provisions of the deed of trust
and statutes relating to the proceedings for the foreclosure
by sale of the deed of trust must be trictly followed (41 C. J.
943; Stephens vs. Clay, 17 Colo. 489,-492, 30 Pac. 43;
Lewis vs. Hamilton, 26 Colo. 263, 267, 58 Pac. 196; Keim
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vs. Axelson, 74 Colo. 459, 461-462, 222 Pac. 651).
In
this connection it is to be borne in mind that this method of
foreclosure is one which cuts out the interests of the owner and
all subsequent grantees and encumbrancees without giving
them their "day in court." And our Supreme Court has
held that, once a private trustee has executed and delivered
his Trustee's Deed, all of his powers in connection with the
deed of trust and its foreclosure are exhausted even though
the proceedings which he had taken in the foreclosure were
defective and the interests of the maker of the deed of trust
or his successors in interest were not cut out by them
(Stephens vs. Clay, supra; Keim vs. Axelson, supra) and
the same rule has been applied to the Public Trustee (Carlson vs. Howes, 69 Colo. 246, 247-248, 193 Pac. 490); but
in a later decision the Supreme Court held that where the
trustee gave a defective deed he could afterwards give a corrcted
one (Brockman vs. DiGiacomo, 76 Colo. 428, 430-431, 232
Pac. 670). So that, if the foreclosure proceedings by the
Public Trustee have not been properly conducted, it is questionable whether, after he has executed and delivered his
Public Trustee's Deed, he can go back and correct any of the
steps prior to the execution of his Public Trustee's Deed or
whether he can start the foreclosure proceedings over. It
will therefore be seen how important it is that each and every
step in the proceedings to foreclosure by advertisement and
sale a deed of trust be taken and followed with the utmost
care and in strict compliance with the provisions of the
statute.
The fact that the statute of limitations may have
barred an action on the debt secured by the deed of trust
will not bar a proceeding for foreclosure of the deed of trust
by advertisement and sale (Holmquist vs. Gilbert, 41 Colo.
113, 92 Pac. 232; Foot vs. Burr, 41 Colo. 192, 92 Pac.
236; McClung vs. Graham, 45 Colo. 268, 269, 100 Pac.
411; Walters vs. Webster, 52 Colo. 549, 552, 123 Pac. 952).
'Formerly, if the deed of trust constituted a lien or encum ~ance upon property owned by decedent at the date of
his death or secured an indebtedness constituting a claim
against the estate of a deceased person, foreclosure by sale by
the Public Trustee of such deed of trust could be had during
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the year following the death of such person only by express
permission of the Probate Court and without such permission
the deed of trust could be foreclosed by sale by the Public
Trustee only after the expiration of one year from the death
of said person (Section 5344 1921 Colorado Compiled Laws;
1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated Chapter 176 Section
208) ; and the same statute by its terms applied to a deed of
trust costituting a lien or encumbrance upon property owned
by a mental incompetent at the date of the adjudication of
his mental incompetency or which secures an indebtedness
constituting a claim against the estate of a mental incompetent. However, a statute passed in 1931 (1931 Session
Laws 793; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40, secs. 65-68) has removed
the restrictions contained in such statute insofar as they apply
to deeds of trust constituting a lien or encumbrance upon
property owned by a decedent at the time of his death or
securing an indebtedness constituting a claim against the
estate of a deceased person, leaving in force the provisions of
the statute insofar as they relate to deeds of trust upon property owned by a mental incompetent at the time of his adjudication or securing indebtedness constituting a claim against
the estate of a mental incompetent.
The first step in the foreclosure by advertisement and
sale by the Public Trustee of a deed of trust is the presenting
to the Public Trustee of the deed of trust to be foreclosed,
the note or notes secured by it and a Notice of Election and
Demand for Sale in which the holder of the indebtedness
declares a violation of one or more of the covenants of the
deed of trust and elects that the property therein described be
advertised for sale; in view of the fact that the 1925 statute
(1925 Session Laws 516, '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40, sec. 64) pro,vides that upon receipt of such Notice of Election and Demand
for Sale the Public Trustee shall securely paste it in a book
to be kept by him for that purpose and shall cause a copy
of it to be recorded in the Recorder's office, it is preferable that
such Notice of Election and Demand for Sale be presented
in duplicate, so that one of them can be recorded and the
other pasted by the Public Trustee in the book kept by him
for that purpose, although it would seem that, under the
statute, if only one Notice of Election and Demand for Sale
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is presented, the pasting of same in the book of the Public
Trustee and the making of a copy of it and the recording of
such copy will be sufficient.
After the presenting of the note or notes, the deed of
trust and the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale, the
next steps to be taken are, as above suggested, the pasting in
the book kept by the Public Trustee for that purpose of
one of the duplicates or the original of such Notice of Election
and Demand for Sale and the recording in the Recorder's
office of a duplicate or a copy of same.
Next comes the preparation of the Notice of Sale. This,
ordinarily, consists of the filling in the blanks in the regular
printed form and is not complicated although care should be
used that it correctly names the parties to the deed of trust
and correctly describes the deed of trust and the real estate
covered by it, and correctly states all other matters called for
by the printed form, and it states as the place where the sale
will be held one which conforms with the place of sale stated
in the deed of trust and that the date stated as the date of the
sale is one which permits publication of the notice for the
required period.
Almost all of the deeds of trust to the Public Trustee
executed prior to the erection of the present City and County
Building of the City and County of Denver stated the place
where the sale should be held as the Tremont Street front door
of the Court House in the City and County of Denver or
on the premises. Such Court House has now been torn
down and the new City and County Building is the present
Court House of the City and County of Denver and to meet
this situation there was passed a statute in 1933 which
authorizes the sale under such deeds of trust to be conducted
at the Bannock Street main entrance to the new City and
County Building located on Civic Center in said City and
County of Denver and which further authorizes the sale under
any deed of trust to be conducted at any door, side or entrance
of the new Court House in cases where, since the execution
of the deed of trust, the Court House therein referred to has
been destroyed or removed or the site thereof otherwise
changed (1933 Session Laws 793-795; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40,
secs. 58-61).

DICTA

Step number four is the publication of the Notice of
Sale. The statute (Sec. 5051 1921 C. L., '35 C. A. S. Ch.
40 sec. 69) says that all deeds of trust shall prescribe a period
of advertising notice of sale, weekly, in some newspaper of
general circulation which publication shall not in any case be
for less than four weeks. Of course the advertisement of the
sale by the Public Trustee must be made for at least the period
specified in the deed of trust. Most deeds of trust provide
for four weeks' public notice of the time and place of the sale
to be given by advertisement weekly in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the County in which the real
estate is situated, but the, provision in the particular deed of
trust regarding advertisement should be examined to make
sure that it does not require a longer period of publication
than four weeks and that it does not require publication
more often than once a week. If publication is to be made
four weeks, it must be borne in mind that publication in four
successive weekly issues will not be sufficient but that the
publication must be made at least once a week for five successive weeks, since the statute (1923 Session Laws 407,
'35 C. A. S. Ch. 130 sec. 6, which is contained in the chapter
relating to Printing. Advertisements and Newspapers) provides: "Where publication for four weeks is required, then
publication once each week for five successive weeks in any
daily, weekly, semi-weekly or tri-weekly newspaper shall be
sufficient."
The fifth step is the one in which the greatest care must
be used. More titles have been objected to because of defects occurring in this stage of the foreclosure than in any
other stage of the proceedings. The step referred to is the
mailing of copies of the Notice of Sale. Many persons whose
title or interest in or lien upon the property is to be cut out
by the foreclosure do not reside in the County where the property is located at the time of the publication of the notice or,
if they do, they may not see the notice in the newspaper and,
for this reason, our Legislature has provided that a printed
copy of the Notice of Sale is to be mailed to each person whose
title or interest is to be cut out by the foreclosure, if his
address appears on the records.
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The importance of the greatest care being used to follow
the provisions of the statute in the mailing of the copies of
the Notice of Sale cannot be emphasized too strongly because,
as already stated, if the provisions of the statute in this regard
are not strictly followed, the entire foreclosure proceeding may
be rendered defective and all of the time and work put in the
foreclosure proceeding and all of the expense gone for naught.
The publication of the Notice of Sale and the mailing of such
Notice are the very heart of the foreclosure proceeding and,
just as the service of summons in a lawsuit is necessary to
confer jurisdiction on the court to enter the judgment, so the
publication and mailing of the Notice of Sale in strict compliance with the provisions of the statute are necessary to
confer power on the Public Trustee to sell the property.
The latest statute on the mailing of the Notice of Sale
was passed in 1925 (1925 Session Laws 516, '35 C. A. S.
Ch. 40 sec. 64).
It provides that the Public Trustee shall
mail a printed copy of the Notice of Sale within ten days
from the date of the first publication thereof to the grantor
or grantors at the address given in the trust deed and that he
shall also mail a like notice to each and every person who
appears to have acquired a record interest in said real estate
subsequent to the recording of said trust deed, whether by
deed, mortgage, judgment or any other instrument of record;
and that such notice shall be mailed to such person, or persons, at the address given in the recorded instrument of writing; also that if such recorded instrument of writing does
not give such address it will not be necessary to mail any
notice to the particular person or persons whose address is
not so given, provided, however, that where only the county
and state is given as the address of such person, or persons,
then such printed notice shall be mailed to the county seat
of such county, and provided further, that it will not be
necessary to mail a copy of said printed notice to any person
whose interest does not appear of record at the time said
Notice of Election and Demand for Sale is recorded.
Let us examine in some detail the foregoing statutory
provisions. First, as to the mailing of notice to the person
or persons who executed the deed of trust which is being
foreclosed. The deed of trust usually contains the address
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of the person or persons who executed it and the notice
should be mailed to each such person at his address so stated
in the deed of trust. If the deed of trust, however, merely
names him as of a certain county and state, then the notice
should be mailed to him at the county seat of that county.
For instance, if, instead of giving a more specific address, the
deed of trust merely described John Jones, who was the maker
of the trust deed, as being of the County of Arapahoe, in the
State of Colorado, the notice should be mailed to John Jones,
Littleton, Colorado, Littleton being the county seat of
Arapahoe County.
In order that the Public Trustee may know the names of
all persons who appear to have acquired a record interest in
the property subsequent to the recording of the deed of trust
which is being foreclosed, whether such record interest was
acquired by deed, mortgage, judgment, mechanic's lien statement or any other instrument of record, either the abstract of
title should be certified by an abstract company down to and
including the recording of the Notice of Election and Demand
for Sale or there should be furnished by an abstract company
a supplemental abstract showing all instruments recorded affecting the property from the recording of the deed of trust
which is being foreclosed to and including the recording of
the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale or there should be
secured from an abstract company a certificate showing the
names of all persons who have acquired a record interest in
the property by instruments recorded during such period and
showing the book and page where each instrument was recorded by which such interest was acquired. A copy of the
printed Notice of Sale should be mailed to each person who
so acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the
recording of the deed of trust which is being foreclosed and
such notice should be mailed to the address of each such person
as such address appears in the recorded instrument by which
each such person acquired his record interest in the property,
that is the deed to such person, the mortgage to such person,
the deed of trust securing a note payable to such person, the
transcript of judgment in favor of such person, the mechanic's
lien statement filed by such person or the instrument, of whatever character it may be, through which such person appears
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to have a record interest in the property. If, as is often the
case, such recorded instrument does not give any specific
address of such person but merely describes him as being of a
certain county and state, then the notice should be mailed to
him at the county seat of that county in the same manner as
already mentioned with reference to the maker of the deed of
trust where his residence was described in the same manner.
Even though it may, as a matter of fact, be known that
any of the persons to whom notice is to be mailed has moved
from the address given in the deed of trust or other recorded
instrument and even though his new and present address may
be known, that does not do away with the necessity of mailing the notice to him at his address as given in the deed of trust
or the recorded deed or other instrument through which he
acquired his record interest. And even though there may
be known the definite city or street or R.F.D. address of
any such person to whom notice is to be mailed but whose
address is stated in the deed of trust or other recorded instrument only by describing him as being of a certain county and
state, that does not do away with the necessity of mailing the
notice to him at the county seat of that county. The requirements of the statute must be complied with no matter what
may be known as to his present address. The fact that the
person to whom is mailed the notice addressed to him at his
present address actually received the notice at such address,
does not prevent the proceeding from being defective on its
face because of failure to mail it to him at his address as given
in the recorded instrument. The merchantability of a title
depends on what the records show and not on what facts in
favor of the validity of the title may be found to exist upon
an investigation outside of the records. However, in any of
such cases where the present address of any such person is
known and is different from the address to which, under the
terms of the statute, the notice is to be mailed, it would be
well to mail the notice to him at his present address in addition
to mailing a notice to him at the address given in the trust
deed or other recorded instrument. It will only incur the
extra expense of a postage stamp to do so and will be in the
interest of fair play to give him actual notice of the sale.
And, for the same reasons, it might be well, although perhaps
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not necessary to the validity of the sale, to endeavor to secure
the actual specific present address of each person to whom
a copy of the notice is to be mailed in order that all may be
done that can reasonably be done under the circumstances to
get actual notice of the sale to each person whose interests
are to be cut out by the foreclosure.
Of course, as is expressly provided by the statute, if the
address of any person who acquired a subsequent record interest is not stated in any manner in any recorded instrument, no
Notice of Sale need be mailed to him; however, if the actual
present address of such person is known it would be well that
a copy of the printed notice be mailed to him at that address
in order that he may receive actual notice of the sale.
The statute which has been discussed containing the
provisions for the mailing of the Notice of Sale was passed
in 1925 and went into effect on June 26, 1925. The statute
regarding this matter which existed up to that time was passed
in 1894 and the provision which it contained regarding the
mailing of Notice of Sale by the Public Trustee was as follows: "The Trustee shall mail a copy of the printed notice
of sale so soon as the same shall be printed, to the grantor
and all subsequent encumbrancers at the address given in
the trust deed without extra charge."
(Sec. 5050 1921 C.
L.). And a provision in this language is contained in most
of the deeds of trust executed prior to the taking effect of the
new law and in fact many deeds of trust which have been
executed since 1925 contained the same provision. There
may be a question as to whether this provision, being contained in the deed of trust, was thereby made a part of the
contract between the parties which could not be changed by
the 1925 law and therefore whether, in foreclosing a deed of
trust executed prior to June 26, 1925, or executed subsequent
to that date and containing the same provision which was
contained in the 1894 statute, the Notice of Sale should be
mailed in the manner set out in such provision. It will be
noted that this provision is that not only is the Notice of Sale
to be mailed to the grantor at the address given in the trust
deed but also that the notice must be mailed to all "subsequent
encumbrancers" at the same address, to-wit: the address given
in the trust deed; this means that the notice mailed to each
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person who acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the execution of the trust deed which is being foreclosed should be mailed to him at the address which the maker
of the deed of trust stated in the trust deed as being his own
address; it may sound foolish to mail a notice to someone
who acquired a subsequent record interest in the property
from the maker of the deed of trust by mailing such notice
to such person who acquired the subsequent interest addressed
to him at the address of the person from whom he acquired
his interest, but this is the meaning of the old statute. Therefore, in the foreclosure of deeds of trust which were executed
before June 26, 1925, or which, although executed after that
date, nevertheless contained the provisions above mentioned
which was contained in the old statute, it is best, in order to
avoid any question on the matter, that both the old statute
and the new one be complied with and that the notice mailed
to each person who acquired a record interest in the property
subsequent to the execution of the deed of trust should be
mailed to him at the address given in the deed of trust as the
address of the maker of the deed of trust and that another
copy of the notice be mailed to him at his address as given in
the recorded instrument by which he acquired his record
interest in the property. It is better to mail out too many
notices rather than too few; it can do no harm to mail too
many but if a notice is not mailed to one person at an address
to which it should be the proceeding may be rendered defective. It is better to be safe than sorry.
Under the 1925 law the notices are to be mailed within
ten days after the first publication. Under the law which
existed prior to 1925 the notices were to be mailed "so soon
as the same shall be printed."
Therefore, in the foreclosure
of a deed of trust executed prior to June 26, 1925, or executed
after that date and containing the provision that the notice
of sale shall be mailed "so soon as the same shall be printed"
it is advisable, in order to avoid any question on the matter,
for the Public Trustee to mail out the notices immediately
upon their being printed instead of waiting almost ten days
after the first publication to do so.
It is suggested that in mailing notices addressed to persons at the same city or town as the one at which the notices
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are mailed three cents in postage be affixed instead of only
two cents. Two cents postage under the present law is
sufficient to carry the letter to any address in the same city or
town as the one at which it is mailed but it is not sufficient
to carry it to any other postoffice. So that the extra one cent in
postage should be affixed in order that, if the person to whom
the notice is mailed has left the city or town to which the
notice is addressed but has left a forwarding address, the notice
can, without complications, be forwarded to him at his new
address and also so that when a notice is mailed to a person
merely at the county seat (because the county and state were
the only address of him given in the recorded instrument) and
the Postmaster knows his correct address in some other city
or town the notice can be forwarded to him at his correct
address without complication.
The Public Trustee should, after he has mailed the
notices, make and sign a certificate of his having mailed the
notices in which he states the name of each person to whom
he mailed a printed copy of the notice of sale and the address
of each person to which he mailed the same and the date he
mailed the same and such certificate should be carefully preserved either by pasting it in the book or by keeping it in
the file of that foreclosure. A printed copy of the notice of
sale should be pasted in the same book in which the Notice
of Election and Demand for Sale is pasted, preferably on the
same page. The affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper
showing the publication of the notice of sale should be furnished by such publisher to the Public Trustee and carefully
preserved by the Public Trustee.
So much for the proceedings preliminary to the sale.
Shortly before the sale is to be held there should be figured
up the amount due and unpaid on the note or notes, principal
and interest, and any amount due for taxes paid with interest
thereon and the fees of the Public Trustee in the matter
(which are fixed by 1933 Session Laws 789, '35 C. A. S. Ch.
40 sec. 56) and the expenses of the proceeding, including
recording fees, abstract fees, publisher's charges, attorney's
fees and other expenses, if any.
It is customary that the deed of trust contain a provision
to the effect that if foreclosure be made by the Public Trustee
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an attorney's fee in an amount specified in the deed of trust
for services in the supervision of the foreclosure proceedings
shall be allowed by the Public Trustee as a part of the costs
of foreclosure. If the deed of trust being foreclosed contains
such a provision and if the foreclosure proceedings are being
supervised by an attorney on behalf of the holder of the note
secured by said deed of trust and if such holder of the note has
paid or agreed to pay the attorney a reasonable attorney's fee
in an amount not in excess of that specified in the note or deed
of trust, it is proper to include as a part of the expense of the
foreclosure such attorney's fee. But the Supreme Court of
Colorado has held that such provisions in a note or an instrument securing a note for the allowance of attorney's fees are
to indemnify the creditor against the expenses incurred in the
employing of an attorney and not to enrich the creditor
(Florence 0. and R. Co. vs. Hiawatha G. 0. and R. Co., 55
Colo. 378, 382, 135 Pac. 454; Jones vs. First National Bank,
74 Colo. 140, 142, 219 Pac. 780; Denver L. &4M. Co. vs.
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 96 Colo. 21, 23, 39 Pac. (2d) 1036).
Therefore if, as often is the case, the foreclosure proceedings
are supervised only by the holder of the note or by his agent
(who is not an attorney) or such proceedings are handled
entirely by the Public Trustee without any supervision, so
that, in any of such cases, they are not supervised by any attorney, then the Public Trustee must not include any attorney's fee as part of the expenses of the foreclosure, even though
the deed of trust or note contains the said provision for an
attorney's fee.
At the time and place named in the printed notice of
sale as the time and place where the sale will be held the Public
Trustee should read aloud the printed notice of sale and then
call for bids. Almost invariably the only bidder at the sale
is the holder of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust
and he usually bids an amount which may be less than but
which is not greater than the amount which is secured by the
trust deed plus the fees and expenses of the foreclosure. After
it is found that no other bid is to be made the Public Trustee
should strike off the property to the person making the only
bid or the person making the highest bid, if there be more
than one bidder, and the Public Trustee should then declare
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that he has sold the property described in the notice of sale to
that purson at the price which he bid, naming such price.
The Public Trustee's fees and expenses of the sale are to be
paid to him in cash immediately after he has declared the
property to have been sold; if the successful bidder is the
owner of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, the
balance of the amount of his bid is to be applied upon the
indebtedness secured by the trust deed. If the highest bidder
is not the holder of the debt secured by the trust deed, the
full amount of the bid must be paid in cash.
The decisions of the courts are in conflict as to the period
during which notice of the adjournment or postponement of
the sale by Public Trustee is to be published in cases where
the sale is not held at the time stated in the original published
notice of sale, but is postponed or adjourned (41 C. J. 966).
The Courts of some states have held that where the sale is
adjourned not only must there be oral announcement of the
adjournment at the time and place stated in the original notice,
but also the Notice of the Adjournment thereof must be published for the same length of time that is required for the
publication of the original Notice of Sale (which, under the
Colorado statutes, would be at least once a week for five successive weeks), but other Courts have held that this is not
necessary provided the notice of the adjournment is such a
notice as will give reasonable publicity and is given in good
faith and contains all the requisites of a Notice of Sale. The
Colorado appellate courts have not ruled upon this question
and therefore it cannot be said which of the two conflicting
rules the Colorado Supreme Court would adopt. Under
these conditions the safe course to follow in the event that the
sale is to be postponed or adjourned is for the Public Trustee
to make, at the time and place of sale stated in the original
published notice, oral announcement that the sale is adjourned
to a certain hour and date (which will allow five weekly
subsequent publications) at the same place and then have
published at least once a week for five successive weeks the
original notice of sale reading exactly as it read when it was
previously published, together with and below same a notice
signed by the Public Trustee stating the above sale has been
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adjourned to and will be held at a certain time and place
which are specified in detail in such notice of adjournment.
Upon making the sale the Public Trustee should enter
in a book kept by him for that purpose a record of the name
of the person or persons who executed the deed of trust, the
date of the trust deed, a brief description of the property
therein described, the date of sale, the name of the newspaper
printing the notice of the sale, the name and last postoffice
address of the purchaser at the sale and the amount at which
the property was sold in separate parcels if so sold or en masse
(1925 Session Laws 516; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 64).
The Public Trustee should then issue in duplicate a
Certificate of Purchase. In doing this the customary printed
form prepared for that purpose should be carefully filled in
and then both copies of the Certificate of Purchase are signed
by him. One of such duplicates should be plainly marked
"Original" and the other should be marked "Duplicate." The
original of the Certificate of Purchase should be delivered to
the purchaser and within ten days from the sale the Public
Trustee should file for record in the office of the Recorder the
duplicate of the Certificate of Purchase and such duplicate
should be returned to the Public Trustee by the Recorder
after it has been recorded and should be preserved in his files
(sec. 5052 1921 C. L.; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 70; 1931
Session Laws 698; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 168). The Certificate of Purchase should be carefully checked over before
the original of it is delivered to the purchaser and the duplicate is recorded.
The statute, as it existed prior to 1931, provided that
the Certificate of Purchase shall-state the time when the purchaser shall be entitled to a deed to the property unless the
same shall be redeemed (sec. 5052 1921 C. L.; '35 C. A. S.
Ch. 40 sec. 70). However, in 1931 a new statute was passed
(1931 Session Laws 698; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 168)
which provides that the Certificate of Purchase shall state
"that the purchaser shall be entitled to a deed of such lands
and tenements at the expiration of the periods of redemption
provided for by law unless the same shall be redeemed as
provided for by law"; both the old and the new statutes also
provide that the Certificate of Purchase shall describe the lands
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and tenements purchased and the sum paid therefor; it is the
practice, however, that other details concerning the deed of
trust and the sale be stated in the Certificate of Purchase and
this practice is a good one as it serves to identify the deed of
trust under which the sale was had and to summarize the
proceedings in connection with the sale.
Unless a redemption is made within the period provided
by law, nothing further need be done until the expiration of
the period of redemption. Upon the expiration of the period
allowed by law for redemption from the sale, then, if no
redemption shall have been made during such period, a Public
Trustee's Deed is to be executed upon the surrender of the
original of the Certificate of Purchase.
The law as it existed from 1894 to 1929 (secs. 50535057 1921 C. L.; '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 secs. 71-75) allowed to
the maker of the deed of trust and his assigns and holders of
subsequent encumbrances six months after the sale in which
to redeem and allowed judgment creditors of the owner of
the property three months after the expiration of such six
months in which to redeem, so that under that law the period
of redemption did not expire until nine months after the
sale and therefore, under that law, Public Trustee's Deed
should not be issued until the expiration of such nine montfis.
However, in Finch vs. Turner, 21 Colo. 287, 291, 40 Pac.
565, it was held that under that law a Sheriff's Deed upon a
sale under execution may, as to the judgment debtor and his
grantee, issue at any time after the expiration of six months
and in McLaughlin vs. Wilson, 23 Colo. App. 59, 61-62,
127 Pac. 242 this ruling was followed in a similar case under
the same law and the Court further held that, it not appearing from the record that any judgment creditor had made
effort to redeem the land from the sale after the six months
and within nine months therefrom, it will be presumed that
no such redemption was attempted.
By a law passed in 1929 (1929 Session Laws 538)
which took effect August 1, 1929, and an amendment thereto
passed in 1931 (1931 Session Laws 696) such 1929 law and
the 1931 amendments being secs. 158-168 Ch. 40 '35 C. A.
S.) a change was made with-respect to the period of redemption; the 1929 and 1931 laws give the owner of the property
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the same six months from the date of the sale in which to
redeem, and give the same period to a person who might be
liable on a deficiency, but, as to redemption by persons having
encumbrances or liens upon the property, they provide that
such persons must, in order to redeem, file within the said
period of six months from the sale with the officer who made
the sale a notice of intention to redeem and that in case any
such notice of intention to redeem is so filed within such six
months the encumbrancee or lienor first in priority who shall
have filed such notice of intention to redeem shall have ten
days after the expiration of said six months in which to redeem and each subsequent encumbrancee or lienor in succession
shall have a five-day period thereafter to redeem according to
the priority of his lien or encumbrance. Therefore, in the
case of a foreclosure of a deed of trust executed after August 1,
1929, a Public Trustee's Deed can be issued immediately after
the expiration of six months from the sale if no redemption
was made during such six months by the owner of the property or by a person who might be liable on a deficiency and
if no encumbrancee or lienor has during such six months filed
with the Public Trustee a notice of his intention to redeem.
As to the issuance of a Public Trustee's Deed on foreclosure of a deed of trust executed prior to August 1, 1929
(when the new redemption statute took effect) the situation
is not as clear or definite. Although it has been held by the
authorities already cited that, as against the judgment debtor
or his grantees, a Sheriff's _Deed of sale on execution is valid
even under the old statute when it was issued after the expiration of six months and before the expiration of nine months
from the date of the Sheriff's sale, the Supreme Court has held
that under the old statute the owner of the property has the
right to the possession of the property until the expiration
of the nine months' period after the sale (Lane vs. Morris, 77
Colo. 343, 346, 237 Pac. 154; Carson vs. Bradford, 91 Colo.
434, 438, 15 Pac. (2d) 977) and the Supreme Court has
said that, after the six-months period of redemption, there
were still two valuable rights still available to the maker of
the deed of trust, namely: possession of the premises until the
deed of the Public Trustee was actually executed and the
right to have the premises redeemed by a judgment creditor
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of his (Farmers', etc. Association vs. San Luis State Bank,
86 Colo. 293, 302, 281 Pac. 366) and, because of these holdings, a number of attorneys are of the opinion that under the
old law there might be considered to be a vested right in the
owner of property who executed a deed of trust prior to
August 1, 1929, to have the full nine months expire after
the sale before his rights to the possession of the property are
cut off and before the rights of his judgment creditors to
redeem are cut off; and such attorneys are of the opinion that
it might be held that such vested rights can not be affected or
cut out by a law passed after the execution of the deed of
trust and that therefore the provisions of the old statute as
to redemption apply to sales made under deeds of trust executed before August 1, 1929, even though such sales are
not made until after that date. Therefore to avoid any
question on this point it is suggested that, in cases of foreclosures of deeds of trust which were executed before August
1, 1929, Public Trustee's Deed be not executed until after the
expiration of the full period of nine months from the date of
the sale.
In case the Certificate of Purchase has been assigned such
assignment should be in writing signed by the purchaser upon
the original of the certificate of purchase (sec. 5058 1921 C.
L., '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 76). While not absolutely
necessary, it is advisable, in case the Certificate of Purchase
has been assigned, to have the assignment on the original of
the Certificate of Purchase acknowledged and to have such
original of the Certificate ?f Purchase with the assignment
thereon recorded in the office of the Recorder in order that the
records of the Recorde¥r and the abstract of title shall show
such assignment. The Public Trustee should be advised of
the assignment and he thereupon should make a note of it on
his records.
After the expiration of the period of redemption provided by the law applicable to the sale without any redemption having been made, the Public Trustee is to execute and
deliver Public Trustee's Deed (1929 Session Laws 541; '35
C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 164). Such deed can be prepared by
carefully filling in the blanks in the customary form of Public
Trustee's Deed and signing and acknowledging it. Care

DICTA

should be taken to check it over and see that it is properly and
accurately filled in and is properly signed and acknowledged.
It is to be made to the holder of the Certificate of Purchase or
to the lienor last redeeming in case a redemption has been
made by a lienor.
In a number of decisions the Colorado Court of Appeals
has said that, irrespective of whether or not the deed of trust
contains a provision to that effect, the recitals in the Trustee's
Deed are prima facie proof of the*matters stated in them (see
decisions cited in Scott vs. Lambert, 24 Colo. App. 260, 263264, 132 Pac. 1145) ; in a later decision the Court of Appeals
said that this rule is limited to recitals which it is a part of the
duties of the officer to make and which are material to the
execution of the trust (Page vs. Gillett, 26 Colo. App. 204,
205, 141 Pac. 866). Both the old statute (sec. 5052, 1921
C. L., '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 70) and the 1931 statute
(1931 Session Laws 698, '35 C. A. S. Ch. 40 sec. 168)
provide that the Certificate of Purchase or a certified copy
thereof shall be taken and deemed evidence of the facts therein
contained. The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that a
Trustee's Deed is invalid where it does not recite the making
of request by the legal owner or holder of the note to have
the trust deed foreclosed or the date on which the publication
of the foreclosure notice was begun, how long the same was
published or in what paper it appeared (Knox vs. Gibson,
23 Colo. App. 402, 403-405, 128 Pac. 470).
The Public Trustee's Deed should not be executed and
delivered until there has been surrendered to the Public Trustee the original of the Certificate of Purchase; except that, if the
holder of the Certificate of Purchase shall have lost the same,
then, as provided by Section 5062 1921 C. L., '35 C. A. S.
Ch. 40 sec. 80, he is to notify at once the Public Trustee of
such loss and is also to give public notice in.a newspaper of
general circulation published in the county where the property
described in the Certificate of Purchase is situated at least once
a week for eight consecutive weeks and upon his having done
so and upon his giving to the Public Trustee a bond in a sum
double the amount of that named in the Certificate of Purchase, which bond is to be approved by the Public Trustee,
the Public Trustee may issue a duplicate Certificate of Pur-
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chase (which must bear upon its face the word "duplicate"
in red ink) and such duplicate can be surrendered to the
Public Trustee with the same effect as the surrender of the
original when a redemption has been made and the redemption
money is to be paid over or when Public Trustee's Deed is to
be issued.
Under the Federal Revenue Law revenue stamps must
be affixed to the Public Trustee'r Deed in the amount of fifty
cents of revenue stamps for each five hundred dollars or fraction of five hundred dollars of the amount for which the
property was sold at the sale. These revenue stamps should
be affixed by the Public Trustee to the deed and should be
cancelled by him.
And the final step in the foreclosure is the filing of the
Public Trustee's Deed for record with the Recorder of the
County in which is located the real estate covered by the foreclosure.
NEW RULES FOR BAILIFFS
Don't Be Idiotic, Marshal Fahey Tells Courtroom Deputies
in Outlining Their Duties.
With an eye to the maintenance of the proper decorum in the
United States District Courtrooms, Marshal William B. Fahey has issued
some pointed instructions to his deputies. They apply with equal force
to bailiffs in all jurisdictions. The instructions follow:
"Strike the table with the gavel. Do not snap your fingers. That
is idiotic. Do not peck on the table with a pencil.
"Maintain order and dignity. No one is permitted in the courtroom without a coat or smoking. No one shall be allowed to stand in
the courtroom, especially not at the desk of the clerk, except some attorney making records.
"Bailiffs are supposed to be on their feet. One bailiff standing is
worth twelve sitting down. Keep out of conversation at the door with
spectators. This will not be tolerated.
"Let women alone in the courtroom. They will take care of
themselves-in corridors, also. They do not need guardians; sometimes bailiffs do.
"Bailiffs are cautioned and warned not to comment on any case on

trial or on testimony of any case on trial."
(From Bench & Bar, Kansas City, Mo., October, 1936.)

ANNOUNCEMENT-Louis E. Gelt has been appointed a member of the committee to report Supreme Court Decisions.
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JUDGMENT ENTERED BY JUSTICE OTHER THAN JUSTICE TO
WHOM CHANGE OF VENUE WAS TAKEN-Citizens Industrial

Bank vs. Lindsley, as Justice of the Peace-No. 13975-Decided
September 28, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
This was an action in mandamus to compel a justice of the peace
to issue execution on a judgment of his court. Mandamus was denied
below. Plaintiff brought suit in the justice court of James N. Sabin
and one of the defendants filed affidavit for a change of venue which
was granted and the suit was transmitted to Henry S. Lindsley, the
nearest justice. At the time of the trial, Lindsley was absent from
the city and requested Sabin, the nearest justice, to serve in his place.
Sabin entered judgment which was later partially satisfied and execution and garnishment was had and two of the defendants moved to
quash the execution and for release of the garnishment on the ground
the judgment was void. Lindsley sustained the motion and this
mandamus action followed.
1. The motion to quash the execution was properly sustained.
The execution being issued on a void judgment, its validity may be attacked by motion to quash in the court where issued.
2. Under Section 6184, Compiled Laws of 1921, where a change
of venue is taken in justice court the original justice was stripped of
all powers except to enter the order of transmittal. Once thus disqualified, the justice remained disqualified for every purpose of the
case, even to the end that he, as substitute justice, could not enter a
continuance even. Therefore, the judgment entered by the substitute
justice who had previously been disqualified, was without authority
and it therefore is void.
3.
By payment on this invalid judgment, defendant consented
to everything which consent could validate, but jurisdiction in this
case could not be conferred by consent.
4. The execution issued on this void judgment was correctly
quashed, and mandamus will not lie in aid of such a situation.
5. Nothing contained herein is to be considered as a criticism,
since it is apparent that the actions of the justice complained of were
in the best of faith.-Judgment affirmed.
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WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION - DEPENDENCY OF POST-INJURY
SPOUSE--State Compensation Insurance Fund, and Hartman
Bros., Inc. us. Hartman, et al.-No. 14007-Decided October 19,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland, En Banc.
Claim for injuries made and
Decedent injured July 11, 1933.
temporary disability benefits paid. After 60 days, he returned to work
and continued until September 23, 1934, when he married the claimThe District Court found that the
ant. He died October 5, 1934.
decedent's death was the proximate result of his accidental injury, and
that the claimant was a dependent within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act as construed in McBride v. Industrial Commission, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P. (2d) 386.
1.
Judgment of trial court affirmed on authority of
HELD:
the holding in the case of McBride u. Industrial Commission, supra.Judgment affirmed.
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